




European	Planning	Studies		Volume	25,	2017	 -	Issue	11:	SPECIAL	 ISSUE	ON	CULTURE	AND	 INNOVATION	 IN	SMEs	AND	MICRO	FIRMS	Pages	1954-1975	|	Received	10	Sep	2016,	Accepted	17	Apr	2017,	Published	online:	10	May	2017					Abstract	The	 article	 deals	with	 the	 strategies	 that	 Italian	 innovative	manufacturing	 companies	 have	deployed	in	recent	years.	Italy	has,	in	fact,	been	hit	particularly	severely	by	the	international	crisis,	 which	 has	 brought	 with	 it	 a	 sharp	 decline	 in	 employment	 and	 a	 narrowing	 of	 the	productive	base.	That	said,	we	know	very	little	about	the	Italian	entrepreneurs’	strategies	to	cope	with	the	economic	downturn.	To	address	this	topic,	the	author	has	used	a	sample	of	over	400	Italian	companies	with	European	patents	in	the	sectors	of	mechanical	engineering	and	high	technology	 (EPO-companies),	 which	 were	 investigated	 by	 means	 of	 a	 panel-survey:	 a	longitudinal	study	carried	out	on	the	same	companies	at	different	times	(2010	and	2012).	The	analysis	has	two	main	goals:	1)	to	describe	the	socio-economic	and	territorial	characteristics	of	EPO-companies	and	their	strategies	in	the	years	of	the	crisis;	2)	to	examine	the	influence	of	a	“collaborative	corporate	culture”	on	company	performance.	What	emerges	from	the	research	into	EPO-companies	is	the	complementarity	of	resources	useful	for	innovation	and	economic	performance,	between:	a)	the	internal	and	external	relations	of	the	organization;	b)	the	variety	of	knowledge	and	cohesion	of	relationships;	c)	the	short	and	long	networks	of	collaboration.	In	conclusion,	successful	company	strategies	are	those	which	–	thanks	to	a	collaborative	company	culture	–	are	able	to	exploit	the	embedded	complementarity	of	innovative	resources.			Key	words:		Innovative	 companies;	 collaborative	 corporate	 culture;	 Company’s	 strategies	 during	 the	economic	crisis;	Italy		
1.	Introduction	One	of	the	central	themes	in	literature	on	economic	innovation	is	the	ability	to	cooperate	in	this	particular	area,	especially	where	small	and	medium	companies	are	concerned.	There	are	two	sides	to	this	issue:	one	internal,	one	external.	While	the	first	concerns	the	endowment	of	human	capital	and	organizational	strategies	that	facilitate	collaboration	and	innovative	creativity,	the	second	regards	the	possibility	of	access	to	resources	external	to	the	company.	These	are	two	sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin,	 since	 getting	 the	 best	 results	 from	 the	 latter	 depends	 on	 both	 the	absorptive	 capacity	 of	 the	 company	 and	 the	 territorial	 endowment	 of	 resources	 and	 local	collective	 goods.	 If	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 external	 resources	 increase	 the	 requisite	 variety	 of	knowledge,	 on	 the	 other,	 internal	 resources	 are	 important	 to	 potentiate	 the	 capacity	 of	
productive	use	of	such	knowledge.	Innovation	studies	often	tend	to	emphasize	that	 innovation	is	the	result	of	a	combination	of	various	 ideas.	 Picking	 up	 on	 the	 suggestion	 of	 Schumpeter	 (1912),	 different	 authors	 have	defined	 innovation	 as	 a	 problem-solving	 process	 of	 a	 combinatorial	 type:	 that	 is,	 oriented	
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towards	 the	 search	 for	 new	 combinations	 with	 known	 elements	 as	 a	 starting	 point.	 With	reference	 to	 technological	 change	 in	 particular,	 stress	 is	 placed	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	circulation	 of	 knowledge	 to	 increase	 the	 variety	 of	 experiences	 and	 ideas	 available	 to	companies.	In	short,	attention	is	focused	on	the	socio-cognitive	dimension	of	innovation.	This	perspective,	however,	is	a	reductive	one.	The	search	for	new	technical	solutions,	in	fact,	is	only	one	aspect	of	the	phenomenon	we	are	dealing	with	–	which	is	broader	and	more	complex.		Firstly,	 economic	 innovation	 is	not	 limited	 to	 technological	 change.	 Following	Keith	Pavitt’s	observation,	we	can	think	of	it	as	a	process	that	involves	“matching	technological	opportunities	with	market	needs	and	organizational	practices”	(2005,	p.	88).	Secondly,	these	combinatorial	processes	are	embedded	in	social	and	economic	relations,	i.e.	in	learning	networks,	which	are	organizationally	and	territorially	structured.	Thirdly,	the	socio-cognitive	aspect	of	innovation	is	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	socio-normative	dimension	 –	 such	as	 the	 internal	 cohesion	of	project	teams,	the	social	capital	available	to	the	company,	etc.	Both	these	dimensions	are	important:	the	 assortment	 of	 cognitive	 resources	 (variety	 of	 knowledge)	 that	 facilitate	 the	 search	 for	innovative	combinations,	and	the	presence	of	socio-normative	resources	(cohesion	and	social	capital)	 that	 facilitate	 the	 exchange	 of	 ideas	 and	 interactive	 learning	 processes	 inside	 and	outside	 the	 company.	 In	 other	 words,	 innovation	 actors	 inside	 the	 companies	 (be	 they	entrepreneurs,	 researchers,	 employees,	 etc.)	 make	 use	 of	 organizational	 relationships	 and	personal	ties,	which	convey	cognitive	resources	of	variety,	as	well	as	normative	resources	of	cohesion	and	trust.			From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 study	 of	 “corporate	 culture”	 –	which	 includes	 both	 the	 socio-cognitive	and	socio-normative	dimensions	–	is	particularly	relevant.	With	these	terms,	I	refer	to	the	system	of	meanings	and	shared	practices	that	guide	both	the	internal	relations,	between	management	and	employees,	and	external	relations	with	other	actors	(companies,	customers,	suppliers,	 research	 centres,	 local	 governments	 etc.).	 Corporate	 culture	 consists	 of	 two	interrelated	aspects:	1)	the	cognitive	and	normative	dispositions	that	guide	behaviour;	2)	the	organizational	and	relational	practices	that	convey	these	and	embed	them	internally.		The	first	aspect	(dispositions)	can	be	compared	to	what	in	the	social	sciences	–	with	reference	to	individuals	–	is	called	“attitude”,	i.e.	a	particular	dispositional	state	based	on	a	combination	of	knowledge,	values	and	beliefs	that	define	the	style	of	the	company	and	direct	the	decisions	and	behaviour	of	the	management	on	specific	issues.	These	dispositions	–	which	are	more	or	less	 shared	 and	 supported	 throughout	 the	 organization	 –	 have	 a	 structured	 character,	connected	both	to	contextual	 factors	(linked	to	the	productive	sector,	 region	and	country	 in	which	the	companies	operate)	and	to	factors	of	a	more	idiosyncratic	kind	(related	to	the	specific	experience	and	skills	accumulated	in	the	company's	history).							The	 second	 aspect	 (practices),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 draws	 on	 two	 strands	 of	 the	 study	 of	innovation	 and	 creativity,	 which	 emphasize	 the	 organizational	 and	 interactional	 aspects	underlying	the	cognitive	and	normative	dimensions.	While	one	strand	explores	the	relationship	between	organizational	design	and	the	ways	in	which	companies	learn	and	innovate	(Arundel,	Lorenz,	Lundvall	&	Valeyre,	2007),	the	other	is	that	of	the	cultural	network	analysis	of	socio-cognitive	spaces.	The	 latter	brings	together	the	study	of	cultural	structures	–	understood	as	group	skills	and	cognitive	styles	that	are	developed	through	social	relations	–	and	the	study	of	groups	 social	 structures	 –	 understood	 as	 networks	 of	 belonging	 and	 interaction	 (De	 Vaan,	Vedres	&	Stark,	2015).	Seen	in	the	light	of	these	contributions,	corporate	culture	throws	an	analytical	bridge	between	structure	and	agency,	as	well	as	between	reproduction	and	change.	On	the	one	hand,	in	fact,	it	embodies	 dispositions	 of	 action	 shaped	 by	 the	 socio-economic	 context	 and	 previous	experience,	 which	 tend	 to	 reproduce	 the	 company's	 routine	 strategies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	however,	 these	 same	 dispositions	 –	 subjected	 to	 new	 economic	 challenges	 –	 can	 steer	management	behaviour	in	the	direction	of	innovation.	Paraphrasing	Giddens,	there	therefore	
 3 
exists	 a	 constitutive	 “dualism”	 in	 corporate	 culture	 connected	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 not	 only	
structured	but	also	structuring.	This	article	will	address	the	theme	of	corporate	culture	and	cooperative	attitudes	by	means	of	data	deriving	from	empirical	research	on	a	sample	of	 Italian	manufacturing	companies	with	European	patents	–	companies	that	have	been	forced	to	face	up	to	the	acute	challenge	presented	by	the	economic	downturn	of	recent	years.	Italy	has,	in	fact,	been	hit	particularly	severely	by	the	 international	 crisis,	 which	 has	 brought	 with	 it	 a	 sharp	 decline	 in	 employment	 and	 a	narrowing	of	the	productive	base.	That	said,	we	know	very	little	about	the	strategies	that	Italian	entrepreneurs,	especially	the	more	innovative	ones,	have	deployed	in	order	to	cope	with	the	crisis.		To	address	this	topic	I	have	mainly	used	a	sample	of	over	400	innovative	Italian	companies,	with	patents	granted	between	1995	and	2004	(that	is,	before	the	crisis)	by	the	European	Patent	Office	(EPO)	in	the	sectors	of	mechanical	engineering	and	high	technology.1	These	companies	were	 investigated	by	means	of	a	panel-survey:	a	 longitudinal	study	carried	out	on	 the	same	firms	at	different	times	(at	the	beginning	of	2010	and	at	the	end	of	2012).2	The	analysis	carried	out	 in	 this	 article	 has	 two	 main	 goals:	 1)	 to	 describe	 the	 socio-economic	 and	 territorial	characteristics	of	EPO-companies	and	their	strategies	in	the	years	of	the	crisis;	2)	to	examine	the	 influence	of	a	 “collaborative	corporate	culture”	on	company	performance.	As	a	proxy	 to	measure	this	latter	dimension,	I	will	use	the	attitude	of	the	EPO-companies	in	terms	of	building	cooperative	 relationships	 both	 internally,	 through	 a	 strategy	 of	 strategic	 integration	 that	valorises	 human	 capital	 and	 organizational	 flexibility,	 and	 externally,	 through	 innovative	partnerships	with	other	actors.		The	article	is	organized	in	the	following	way.	In	the	next	two	sections	(§	2-3),	I	will	present	–	concisely	and	with	no	claims	to	exhaustiveness	–	certain	contributions	that	have	stressed	the	importance	of	 territorial	proximity	and	organizational	strategies	 in	order	 to	understand	the	economic	and	innovative	performance	of	companies.	In	the	three	following	sections	(§	4-5-6),	I	will	illustrate	the	distinctive	profile	of	EPO-companies.	Finally,	in	the	last	two	sections	(§	7-8),	I	 will	 analyse	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 latter	 and	 draw	 some	 conclusions	 of	 a	more	 general	nature.			
2.	Contextual	factors:	the	geography	of	innovation			Innovation	 does	 not	 happen	 everywhere.	 It	 tends	 to	 agglomerate	 in	 certain	 places,	 rich	 in	resources	 strictly	 linked	 to	 the	 socio-institutional	 context	 (universities,	 research	 centres,	advanced	 services,	 etc.).	 The	 spatial	 dimension	 is	 important	 for	 innovation	 for	 three	main	reasons.	The	first	is	that	the	introduction	of	new	products	and	production	processes	involves	the	interaction	and	exchange	between	a	plurality	of	actors	(companies,	governments,	research	centres);	it	is	configured	as	a	joint	process	of	creation	and/or	application	of	new	knowledge,	which	is	facilitated	by	spatial	proximity	(Asheim	&	Gertler,	2005).		The	second	reason	relates	to	the	importance	of	local	collective	competition	goods	which	create	external	economies,	that	is	to	say	special	benefits	for	the	companies,	because	they	both	lower	
                                               
1	These	productive	sectors	represent	the	majority	of	Italian	patents	in	Europe:	the	mechanical	engineering	sector	covers	31%,	the	high-tech	sector	24%.	Patents	are	a	well-established	indicator	in	the	scientific	literature	(especially	in	the	economic	field)	that	studies	innovative	output.	For	a	discussion	of	the	analytical	potential,	as	well	as	the	limitations,	of	this	indicator,	see	Ramella	&	Trigilia	(2010a). 2 	These	 two	 surveys	 form	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 investigation	 into	 the	 geography	 of	 innovation	 in	 high	technology	in	Italy	that	I	carried	out	with	Carlo	Trigilia	(Ramella	&	Trigilia	2010a,	2010b).	For	details,	see	the	Methodological	Appendix.		
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production	costs	and	increase	innovative	capacity.	These	externalities	can	be	either	tangible	or	intangible:	the	former	include	infrastructure	and	local	services;	the	latter,	both	cognitive	and	normative	 resources,	 such	 as	 tacit,	 contextualised	 knowledge,	 conventions,	 norms	 of	reciprocity,	and	local	social	capital	(Crouch,	Le	Galès,	Trigilia,	&	Voelzkow,	2001).		The	third	reason	is	linked	to	knowledge	spillovers	–	the,	more	or	less	voluntary,	circulation	of	information	and	knowledge	produced	 in	the	activity	of	research	and	 innovation.	Knowledge	spillovers	produce	positive	externalities	which	also	benefit	actors	who	have	not	contributed	to	the	production	of	the	knowledge.	As	a	result,	the	innovative	performance	of	companies	depends	not	only	on	the	resources	that	they	invest	in	research	(within	the	company	itself),	but	also	from	those	invested	by	other	companies	and	other	actors	in	the	same	sector	or	related	sectors,	as	well	as	by	universities,	research	centres,	etc..	The	appropriation	of	these	spillovers	is	linked,	however,	to	proximity	to	the	source	of	new	knowledge,	and	this	proximity	becomes	even	more	relevant	the	more	“tacit	knowledge”	is	also	used	in	the	innovation	(Polanyi,	1966).		In	 fact,	 this	 territorial	 expertise,	 rather	 than	 disappearing,	 actually	 assumes	 particular	importance	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 globalisation	 processes.	 The	more	 codified	 knowledge	circulates	easily	through	global	networks,	the	more	tacit	knowledge	becomes	a	strategic	asset,	generating	a	competitive	advantage	that	is	difficult	to	imitate	(Maskell	&	Malmberg,	1999).		In	short,	the	production	and	dissemination	of	–	economically	significant	–	new	knowledge	often	take	place	at	a	local	level,	in	territorial	systems	of	innovation,	through	the	dynamics	of	learning	through	interacting	(Lundvall	&	Johnson,	1994).		Various	 strands	 of	 the	 literature	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 re-discovery	 of	 the	 “territories	 of	innovation”.	Some	economists	have	explored	either	the	existence	of	“geographically	bounded”	spillovers,	or	the	“localized	effects	of	university	research”	due	to	the	human	capital	conveyed	by	star	scientists.	Others	have	worked	on	systems	of	innovation	at	the	national	and	regional	level	and	on	the	competitive	advantages	created	by	agglomeration	economies	(Ramella,	2016).	In	general,	however,	economists	have	mainly	underlined	the	cognitive	aspects	of	the	circulation	of	 information	and	knowledge	and	the	importance	of	territorial	proximity	in	facilitating	this	circulation.	 In	 the	 most	 recent	 years,	 however,	 economic	 geographers	 have	 elaborated	 a	gradual	“relativisation”	and	“socialisation”	of	the	concepts	of	distance	and	proximity	and	their	transformation	 in	 relational	 terms	 (Rodríguez-Pose,	 2011).	 Recent	 considerations	 have	attempted	to	make	these	categories	less	static	and	more	processual,	transforming	them	into	a	continuum	of	multi-level	 relations	–	relations,	 that	 is,	 that	 take	place	on	different	 territorial	levels.	In	other	words,	there	is	a	“relational	stretching”	of	the	distance/proximity	dyad,	with	the	result	 that	 these	 concepts	 lose	 their	 exclusive	 anchorage	 to	 the	 dimension	 of	 geographical	space.	 In	 this	way,	 distance	 is	 socialised:	 different	 types	 of	 relationship	between	 the	 actors	render	 territorial	 proximity	 more	 or	 less	 important	 and	 proximity	 thus	 becomes	 a	multidimensional	concept	(Boschma,	2005).		Finally	sociologists,	have	helped	to	understand	the	social	construction	of	innovation	at	different	territorial	 and	 analytical	 levels.	 At	 the	macro	 (global	 and	national)	 and	meso	 (regional	 and	local)	level	of	analysis,	they	have	underlined	the	importance	of	the	socio-institutional	context	and	of	the	“modes	of	regulation”,	exploring	the	links	between	different	varieties	of	capitalisms	and	their	regime	of	innovation.	At	the	micro-level,	they	have	analysed	the	social	embeddedness	of	economic	activities,	underlining	the	influence	of	networks	of	interactions	among	innovative	actors	(Ramella,	2016).			
3.	Agency	and	relational	factors:	entrepreneurial	strategies	That	said,	the	emphasis	placed	on	the	territorial	and	systemic	aspects	of	innovation	should	not	over-restrict	 the	 space	 attributed	 to	 agency	 and	 relational	 factors	 –	 in	 other	 words,	 to	entrepreneurial	strategies.	As	has	been	pointed	out,	a	common	error	in	various	institutional	
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and	systemic	approaches	is	to	read	the	behaviour	of	the	actors	–	the	companies,	for	instance	–	only	through	the	characteristics	of	the	contexts	in	which	they	operate	(Gertler,	2010,	p.	5).	But	companies	have	a	certain	strategic	autonomy	with	regard	to	the	institutional	contexts	to	which	they	pertain:	 they	 are	not	 exclusively	 rule-takers	but	 also	 rule-makers	 (Crouch,	 Schröder,	&	Voelzkow,	2009).	They	derive	a	substantial	degree	of	freedom	from	the	reflexive	re-elaboration	of	the	repertoire	of	skills	and	experience	they	have	inherited	from	their	own	past.	And	this	in	a	way	that	is	partly	independent	of	the	industry	and	the	country	in	which	they	operate.	Susan	Berger	(2005)	described	this	approach	as	the	“dynamic	legacies	model”.		The	 study	 of	 innovation	 cannot,	 therefore,	 leave	 the	 choices	made	 by	 companies,	 and	 their	competitive	and	organisational	strategies,	out	of	consideration.	With	regard	to	the	latter,	for	example,	certain	studies	link	the	innovative	capacity	of	companies	to	the	specific	organizational	designs	that	they	adopt.	Research	carried	out	by	Lester	and	Piore	(2004)	on	case	studies	in	the	fields	 of	 mobile	 phones,	 medical	 appliances	 and	 clothing,	 shows	 that	 the	 most	 important	innovations	derive	from	an	organizational	and	management	approach	of	an	“interpretive”	type.	The	authors	contrast	two	different	procedural	approaches	to	problem-solving:	analytical	and	interpretive.	Analytical	processes	are	those	that	can	be	applied	when	the	problems	to	be	solved	and	the	possible	results	are	well-known.	Interpretive	processes,	however,	are	more	appropriate	when	 neither	 the	 decision	 alternatives	 nor	 the	 possible	 outcomes	 are	 known	 in	 advance.	Solutions,	therefore,	must	be	sought	by	exploring	the	frontier	of	innovation.	In	the	latter	case,	the	activity	of	discovering	new	solutions	proceeds	through	interpretive	conversations	between	people	 that	 pertain	 to	 different	 organizational	 areas	 and	 work	 teams.	 Managerial	 activity,	therefore,	is	aimed	at	promoting	the	open	exchange	of	communication	and	integrating	a	variety	of	 resources	 in	 order	 to	 cross	 predetermined	 cognitive	 and	 organizational	 boundaries.	 The	results	of	the	study	shed	light	on	how	the	creation	of	these	“interpretive	spaces”	–	open	to	the	contribution	of	a	plurality	of	subjects	–	produces	the	best	results.		The	three	case	studies	analysed	by	David	Stark	(2009)	–	through	ethnographic	research	on	the	media	and	on	finance	in	the	United	States,	and	on	the	machine	tool	sector	in	Hungary	–	also	bring	 out	 this	 interpretive	 aspect	 in	 relation	 to	 innovation.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 when	organizations	 find	 themselves	 operating	 in	 competitive	 environments	 characterised	 by	scenarios	 of	 radical	 uncertainty.	 In	 these	 contexts	 the	 best	 performance	 is	 obtained	 by	
heterarchical	organisations,	which	are	able	to	take	advantage	of	the	uncertainty,	nurturing	an	ongoing	capacity	for	innovation.	These	organizations	tend	to	systematically	and	intentionally	question	 organizational	 routine	 and	 foster	 copresence	 and	 dialogue	 between	 different	evaluative	criteria,	deriving	from	different	units	and	skills.	Heterarchy,	therefore,	represents	a	strategy	 that	 tends	 to	 “organise	dissonance”,	 exploiting	 the	 intelligence	dispersed	within	an	organization	and	coordinating	it,	without	suppressing	the	presence	of	different	principles	of	evaluation	 and	 valorisation.	 The	 interactive	 coexistence	 of	 dissonant	 elements,	 generates	“creative	frictions”	and	these	foster	the	innovative	recombination	of	resources.		If,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 perspective	 on	 business	 reclaims	 the	 analytical	 independence	 of	“agency	factors”,	 it	does	not,	on	the	other,	mean	isolating	the	companies	from	the	context	in	which	they	operate.	On	the	contrary,	what	is	really	interesting	is	to	see	how	they	are	able	to	exploit	 the	 opportunities	 or	 compensate	 for	 obstacles	 which	 are	 present	 in	 the	 context,	developing	interactive	learning	networks	(relational	factors).	Both	internally,	and	externally.	In	fact,	in	recent	years,	emphasis	has	been	placed	on	the	development	of	organizational	forms	that	are	not	only	more	 flexible	but	 also	more	open	 to	 collaboration	with	other	 actors,	 including	businesses,	 universities,	 local	 agencies	 etc.	 The	 rapidity	 of	 technological	 change,	 the	uncertainty	 of	 its	 evolutionary	 trajectories,	 growing	 international	 competition,	 and	 the	pluralisation	 of	 knowledge	 sources	 have	 made	 companies	 more	 dependent	 on	 external	resources.	Inter-organizational	partnerships	(alliances	between	companies,	collaboration	with	universities,	etc.)	have	therefore	multiplied,	especially	in	the	field	of	research	and	innovation.	
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And	this	has	focused	the	attention	of	Innovation	Studies	on	the	social	and	economic	networks	that	support	them	(Powell	&	Grodal,	2005).		In	conclusion,	the	different	business	strategies	(agency	and	relational	factors)	help	to	explain	the	 significant	 heterogeneity	 of	 performance	 observed	 both	 in	 the	 territories	 and	 in	 the	productive	sectors	(contextual	factors).	And	yet,	where	the	behaviour	of	the	most	innovative	companies	during	the	international	economic	crisis	is	concerned,	we	know	relatively	little.			
4.	The	profile	of	the	innovative	Italian	companies		Italy	represents	a	particularly	interesting	case	in	terms	of	analysing	the	issues	mentioned	in	the	two	preceding	sections,	and	for	two	reasons.	The	first	because	it	embodies	a	regionalised	model	of	capitalism	with	a	strong	territorial	agglomeration	of	innovation	(Trigilia	and	Burroni	2009;	Ramella	 and	 Trigilia	 2010a,	 2010b;	 Burroni	 and	 Trigilia	 2011).	 Secondly,	 because	 its	production	 structure	 has	 been	 highly	 modified	 by	 the	 crisis,	 and	 it	 therefore	 becomes	interesting	 to	 understand	 if	 and	 how	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 particular	 management	 strategy	 –	collaborative	in	nature	–	has	helped	some	firms	to	cope	with	this	radical	challenge.		With	 regard	 to	 the	 first	 point,	 as	 is	 well-known,	 Italy	 is	 the	 second	 largest	 manufacturing	country	in	Europe.	Perhaps	less	well-known	is	the	fact	that	this	also	applies	to	medium-high	and	high	technology	sectors.	Grouping	these	productive	sectors	together,	it	turns	out	that,	in	2012,	Italy	was	first	in	Europe	in	terms	of	number	of	companies,	second	in	terms	of	volume	of	employment	and	third	in	terms	of	turnover	and	value	added	(calculations	based	on	Eurostat	data).	 This	 indicates	 an	 extremely	 respectable	productive	potential	 that,	 however,	 does	not	seem	 able	 to	 translate	 into	 an	 equivalent	 capacity	 for	 innovation,	 as	 the	 data	 regarding	patenting	 clearly	 highlights.	 In	 general,	 Italian	 patenting	 intensity	 is	 fairly	 low,	 standing	 at	around	two-thirds	of	the	European	average	(70	patents	per	million	inhabitants	vs.	109),	but	it	is	the	country’s	performance	in	high-tech	sectors	that	is,	in	fact,	far	from	satisfactory,	where	it	manages	only	a	quarter	of	 the	EU	average	 (2.8	vs	10.5).	The	gap,	 in	other	words,	 increases	precisely	in	the	productive	sectors	where	the	deficiencies	of	the	national/regional	systems	of	innovation	have	a	stronger	and	more	negative	impact.	As	 regards	 the	 second	 point,	 it	 should	 be	 remembered	 that	 the	 blow	 delivered	 by	 the	international	economic	crisis	to	the	Italian	manufacturing	system	was	a	particularly	severe	one.	There	 has	 been	 not	 only	 a	 significant	 slowdown	 in	 economic	 growth,	 but	 also	 a	 drastic	reduction	in	employment	and	investment.3	And	yet,	less	negative	signals	also	emerged	in	the	years	of	crisis,	such	as	an	increase	in	the	percentage	of	companies	taking	a	pro-active	approach	by	investing	in	innovation.4	Analysing	the	profile	of	 innovative	companies,	especially	 in	high	technology	areas,	may	therefore	prove	interesting	in	terms	of	defining	the	ingredients	(external	and	internal)	that	explain	this	improved	performance.	To	 investigate	 this	 question,	 a	 survey	was	 therefore	 carried	 out	 on	 Italian	 companies	with	European	 patents	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 mechanical	 engineering	 and	 high	 technology	 (EPO-companies).	407	companies	responded	–	in	whole	or	in	part	–	to	the	first	questionnaire	(see	the	Methodological	Appendix),	with	a	total	of	1,478	patents,	an	average	of	3.6	per	firm.	Their	
                                               3	Giving	the	per	capita	GDP	of	the	EU	a	value	of	100,	in	2000	Italy	had	a	value	of	120.	In	2014,	this	fell	to	98,	with	a	reduction	of	as	many	as	22	percentage	points.		4	For	greater	detail	regarding	the	effects	of	the	economic	crisis	on	Italy	and	the	Mediterranean	countries,	see	Donatiello	and	Ramella	(2017).	
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territorial	origin	is	concentrated	in	the	more	developed	regions	of	Italy.	43%	are	located	in	the	north-west	and	50%	–	especially	those	involved	with	mechanical	engineering	–	in	the	Central	and	North-east	regions:	the	so-called	“Third	Italy”.		Their	biographical	and	structural	profile	highlights	the	solidity	of	the	EPO-companies.	Almost	80%	have	 been	 active	 for	 over	 20	 years.	 Although	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 prevalence	 of	 small	 and	medium-sized	 companies	 (under	 250	 employees),	 about	 half	 are	 medium-large	 (over	 50	employees)	and	have	a	good	 turnover	 (over	10	million	euros)	and	high	 labour	productivity	(with	a	turnover	per	employee	of	around	257,000	euros).	In	the	main,	they	are	companies	that	cater	to	national	and	international	markets,	providing	–	particularly	in	the	engineering	sector	–	 intermediate	and	capital	goods	(machinery	and	components)	 that	other	companies	use	 to	produce	goods	destined	for	final	consumers.	The	areas	in	which	they	operate	are	characterized	by	a	high	level	of	competition	and	radical	uncertainty,	 and	 human	 capital	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	 resources	 to	 address	 these	 competitive	scenarios:	49%	of	entrepreneurs	are	university	graduates	and	half	of	 the	employees	have	a	high-school	diploma	or	a	certificate	of	higher	education.	Internal	training	is	also	given	a	great	deal	 of	 attention.	 Overall,	 we	 are	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 solid	 companies	 with	 a	 good	 level	 of	production	performance.	And	this	is	the	first	distinctive	aspect	of	EPO-companies.	To	see	this	clearly,	 it	 is	only	necessary	to	compare	their	profiles	with	the	average	profile	present	 in	the	same	areas	at	a	national	level	(Table	1).		
Table 1 Profile of EPO companies compared to average national values  
 EPO companies  National companies 
 High technology 
Mechanical 





Employees        
Up to 9 employees 10.1 8.7 9.1  88.8 75.8 81.3 
10-49 employees 31.9 38.1 36.3  8.7 19.8 15.1 
50-249 employees 37.7 31.2 33.1  2.0 3.8 3.1 
250 employees and more 20.3 22.0 21.5  0.5 0.6 0.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Up to 19 employees        
Turnover 
(thousand euros) 2,116 2,524 2,419  289 567 444 
Turnover per employee 
(thousand euros) 181 268 244  104 130 121 
% of turnover on exports 44.0 42.5 42.9  14.3 24.8 21.8 
20 employees and more        
Turnover (thousand euros) 352,108 57,538 142,339  34,860 21,273 24,974 
Turnover per employee 
(thousand euros) 378 215 262  254 248 250 
% of turnover on exports 53.4 63.8 60.7  36.5 52.6 46.5 
Source: EP0-survey 2010; Istat Conti economici delle imprese, 2010, our elaborations. 	Amongst	EPO-companies,	micro-businesses	with	fewer	than	10	workers	are	seriously	under-represented:	just	9%,	while	in	Italy	they	exceed	80%.	Conversely,	medium	and	large	companies	(over	50	employees)	are	over-represented:	55%	against	an	 Italian	average	 that	approaches	only	4%.	Where	size	is	similar,	performance	is	higher	in	terms	of	turnover,	labour	productivity	and	export	capacity.	The	gap	is	particularly	significant	for	smaller	companies.	Those	with	fewer	than	20	employees	have	a	turnover	six	times	higher	than	other	Italian	companies	operating	in	
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the	 same	 sectors,	 while	 labour	 productivity	 and	 export	 share	 are	 nearly	 double.	 Such	performance	levels	are	extremely	important,	highlighting	high	competitive	capacity	linked	–	as	we	shall	see	–	to	innovation.						
5.	Research	activity	EPO-companies	 invest	 heavily	 in	 research	 and	 development	 (R&D).	 On	 average	 in	 the	mechanical	engineering	sector,	a	5%	share	of	the	turnover	is	devoted	to	this	area,	while	for	high	technology	companies	the	figure	is	7%.	These	are	considerable	resources,	especially	as	regards	the	first	of	the	two	sectors.	Research	work	is	carried	out	by	specific	project	teams,	present	in	79%	of	EPO-companies	(source:	EP0-survey	2010).	The	work	of	the	teams	is	overseen	by	senior	managerial	figures	who	ensure	the	coordination	and	integration	of	the	various	projects.	Team	organization	follows	a	precise	model,	characterised	by	cohesion	and	flexibility:	coordination	by	one	or	more	people	is	accompanied,	as	regards	researchers,	by	a	strong	tendency	towards	self-management	 in	 their	work.	 It	 is	 a	matter,	 therefore,	 of	 small,	 highly	 cohesive	work	 groups,	within	which	researchers	enjoy	a	considerable	level	of	autonomy	in	carrying	out	their	duties.		Informal	discussions	with	colleagues	–	especially	those	working	for	the	same	company	–	play	a	particularly	important	role.	These	ongoing	dialogues	represent	the	hidden	ingredient	in	what	we	might	call	the	“dialectic	of	discovery”.	This	is	the	subtle	weft	of	conversation	(more	or	less	formalized),	 exchanges	 of	 ideas,	 lively	 discussions	 and	 occasional	 clashes,	 which	 does	 not	exclude	playfulness,	that	leads	the	group	work	towards	the	invention	(which	may	or	may	not	patented).			 These	discussions	(...)	are	usually	never	organized.	They	take	place	in	the	canteen,	or	 after	 5.00	 pm,	 or	 over	 a	 pizza,	 when	 we’re	 chatting	 about	 how	 a	 particular	machine	should	be	made	(mechanical	sector).		These	 conversations	 accompany	 the	 process	 of	 discovery	 both	 in	 the	 generative	 phase	 of	invention	–	that	is,	in	the	work	done	before	the	discovery	–	and	in	the	later	phase	of	verification	and	development	of	the	new	idea	hatched	at	the	crucial	moment	of	insight.		
	 When	 an	 idea	 comes	 to	 you,	 it	 doesn’t	 immediately	 come	 all	 wrapped	 up	 and	finished,	with	the	colours	and	details	all	in	place.	Instead,	you	have	this	nebulous,	confusing	stuff	that	you	can’t	represent	or	build.	So	then	comes	a	phase	when	the	nebulous,	out-of-focus	stuff	has	 to	be	clarified.	And	 talking	 to	others	can	be	very	useful	to	move	this	idea	on	from	the	nebulous	phase	to	the	stage	where	it	becomes	clear	and	defined	(mechanical	sector).		It	is	not	only	the	ongoing	confrontation	with	close	colleagues	that	is	important,	however,	but	also	the	cooperation	with,	and	flow	of	information	through,	the	various	teams	present	in	the	same	 organization.	 And	 this	 requires	 a	 specific	 corporate	 culture	 and	 an	 organizational	approach	capable	of	generating	positive-sum	games	and	nourish	mutual	trust,	so	as	to	avoid	what	one	interviewee	defines	as	the	“closed	drawer”	trap.		
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Office	 relationships	 are	 important.	 (...)	 You	 can’t	 have	 the	 “closed	 drawer”	philosophy	going	around,	because	that	way	you’ll	never	get	anywhere	(mechanical	sector).		 You’d	try	and	do	something	together	with	the	laboratories	and	then	you’d	come	back	and	re-discuss	everything.	(...)	In	one	laboratory	there	could	also	be	people	working	on	 different	 types	 of	 projects,	 but	 there	 was	 always	 a	 discussion	 going	 on	(pharmaceutical	sector).		Alongside	these	elements,	however,	 the	role	played	by	the	plurality	of	skills	and	knowledge	available	should	not	be	forgotten.	The	variety	of	cognitive	resources5	is,	in	fact,	crucial	for	the	success	 of	 inventions	 and	 their	 subsequent	 development.	 In	 59%	 of	 cases,	 the	 skills	 of	researchers	 are	defined	by	 interviewees	 as	akin:	 all	 the	 team	members	belong	 to	 the	 same	scientific	field,	but	with	quite	different	specializations.	In	30%	of	companies,	however,	the	skills	are	 highly	 heterogeneous	 and	 involve	 the	 collaboration	 of	 researchers	 from	 a	 variety	 of	scientific	and	technological	fields.	Finally,	in	the	remaining	11%	of	cases,	there	are	teams	with	very	homogenous	skills	(source:	Inventors-Survey).		The	variety	of	internal	skills	influences	the	absorptive	capacity	of	the	project	teams	and,	more	generally,	of	the	companies	themselves	(Cohen	&	Levinthal,	1990).	The	presence	of	a	plurality	of	specializations,	in	fact,	increases	their	ability	to	absorb	information	from	outside.	To	acquire	the	knowledge	 that	 is	useful	 to	 them,	companies	make	extensive	use	of	different	sources	of	information:	some	comes	from	the	company	itself	or	from	other	companies	within	the	same	group	 (internal	 sources);	 other	 information	 is	 derived	 from	 relationships	 with	 suppliers,	customers,	 competitors,	 etc.	 (external	 market	 sources);	 and	 more	 again	 arrives	 from	relationships	with	research	institutes,	universities,	consultants	etc.	(external	technico-scientific	
sources).	 In	general,	EPO-companies	mainly	make	use	of	 the	first	 two	types	of	channels.	But	what	most	differentiates	 them	 is	 the	use	of	knowledge	 from	the	scientific	and	 technological	community	that	is	superior	not	only	in	high-tech	sectors	and	in	the	larger	companies,	but	also	in	those	with	a	greater	endowment	of	researchers	and	with	more	diverse	skills	in	project	teams.		A	 variety	 of	 internal	 resources	 (the	 extent	 and	 plurality	 of	 skills),	 therefore,	 significantly	influences	innovative	capacity.	In	general,	a	deficit	in	variety	greatly	hinders	the	production	of	new	 and	 truly	 creative	 ideas	 which	 require,	 in	 addition	 to	 synergy	 within	 the	 team,	organizational	models	that	allow	the	circulation	of	various	types	of	knowledge,	derived	by	the	company	from	both	internal	and	external	sources.		 	(The	 most	 innovative	 companies	 are	 those	 where)	 information	 circulates,	 both	vertically	 and	 horizontally.	 Success	 is	 information	 plus	 integration,	 because	sometimes	it’s	opposing	knowledge	and	skills	that	create	the	solution.	(...)	Working	time	has	to	be	broken	up,	to	create	discontinuity	in	the	routine;	and	this	generates	stress,	generates	ideas...	in	fact,	I’d	say	that	ideas	are	produced	under	stress.	(...)	And	
                                               5	In	 other	 words,	 the	 extent	 and	 plurality	 of	 knowledge	 and	 skill	 available	 within	 the	 company	 or	acquired	through	external	relations.	
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that’s	why	we	 need	 to	 have	 teams	with	 different	 knowledge	 and	 different	 skills	(mechanical	sector).		As	 can	be	 seen,	 these	observations	are	very	much	 in	 line	with	 the	 interpretive	approach	 to	problem	solving,	 highlighted	by	Lester	 and	Piore,	 and	with	 the	heterarchical	 organizational	forms	described	by	David	Stark.	These	results	are	also	confirmed	in	studies	on	organizations	at	the	cutting-edge	of	scientific	research	(Hollingsworth,	R.	Hollingsworth,	E.J.	&	Hage	2008).				
6.	The	social	and	territorial	embeddedness	of	EPO-companies	As	previously	mentioned,	however,	organizational	flexibility	and	internal	skills	alone	are	not	enough	to	ensure	good	innovative	performance.	Since	the	mid-nineties,	innovation	studies	have	shown	growing	interest	in	inter-organizational	relationships	due	to	the	exponential	increase	in	collaborative	 relations	 between	 companies,	 especially	 those	 in	 the	 high-tech	 sectors	(Hagedoorn,	 2002	 ,	 pp.	 479-482),	 and	 the	 diffusion	 of	 business	 strategies	 based	 on	 open	
innovation	(Chesbrough,	2003).		Collaborative	practices	of	this	kind	are	widespread	among	Italian	EPO-companies.	Overall,	70%	of	 EPO-companies	 have	 at	 least	 one	 innovative	 partnership:	 59%	of	 them	have	 at	 least	 one	partnership	with	other	companies	(mainly	small	and	medium	size)	and	54%	with	a	research	centre	or	university	 (source:	EP0-survey	2010).	These	are	extraordinarily	high	 figures,	 as	 is	clear	from	the	comparison	with	national	averages.	In	Italy,	in	fact,	in	the	same	period	in	which	we	conducted	the	research,	only	13%	of	innovative	companies	had	cooperation	agreements	for	innovation	with	external	partners:	this	was	the	lowest	percentage	in	Europe,	where	on	average	recorded	values	were	25%	(CIS,	2010).	While	percentages	rise	in	the	high	technology	sector,	they	 still	 place	 Italy	 in	 the	 lowest	 positions	 in	 European	 ranking.	 The	 point,	 to	 emphasis,	therefore,	 is	 the	pervasiveness	of	 innovative	partnerships,	which	represent	a	highly	distinctive	
element	of	EPO-companies.		But	what	kind	of	collaborations	are	they?	Most	of	them	involve	partners	located	at	a	certain	geographical	distance:	they	are	based,	in	other	words,	on	“long	networks”	(extra-regional)	that	make	it	possible	for	them	to	acquire	non-redundant	knowledge	and	skills	–	that	is,	resources	and	 information	different	 to	 those	already	 in	possession	of	 the	 company	and	which	are	not	available	 in	 the	 surrounding	 area.	 42%	 of	 companies	 have	 partnerships	 with	 national	companies	 and	 34%	 with	 foreign	 companies;	 34%	 with	 national	 universities	 or	 research	centres,	and	17%	with	foreign	institutions.	This	does	not	mean	that	short	networks	–	relations	with	 local/regional	 companies	 and	universities	 –	 are	not	 significant:	48%	have	at	 least	one	collaboration	of	 this	kind	(source:	EP0-survey	2010).	However,	 long	networks	should	not	be	seen	as	in	opposition	to	short	networks,	since	in	most	cases	they	coexist	and	nourish	each	other.	In	 fact,	amongst	companies	with	at	 least	one	partnership,	 those	that	combine	regional/local	and	 extra-regional	 collaborations	 represent	 the	 majority:	 56.3%.	 Companies	 with	 only	regional/local	 collaborations	 amount	 to	 14%,	 while	 those	 who	 have	 only	 extra-regional	collaborations	amount	to	29.7%.	Similarly,	 it	 would	 be	 a	mistake	 to	 identify	 these	 innovative	 partnerships,	 which	 convey	 a	variety	of	resources,	with	relationships	governed	exclusively	by	the	market.	Interviewees	were	asked	 to	 rank	 innovative	 partnerships	with	 other	 companies,	 distinguishing	 between	 those	with	whom	they	have	an	occasional	kind	of	relationship	based	solely	on	the	logic	of	the	market	(market	ties)	and	those	with	whom	they	have	established	relationships	over	a	period	of	time	and	where	trust	plays	a	major	role	(socio-economic	ties).	In	two	thirds	of	cases,	it	is	this	second	
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type	of	relationship	that	prevails.	And	this	is	regardless	of	the	sectors,	the	size	of	the	companies	and	 the	 geographical	 location	 of	 the	 partner.	 Our	 research	 therefore	 clearly	 shows	 the	predominant	role	of	-	long	lasting	and	trust	based	-	“strong	ties”	in	the	structuring	of	innovative	partnerships,	both	local	and	non-local.	In	fact,	the	importance	of	tacit	knowledge,	but	also	the	risks	of	opportunism	related	to	the	use	of	more	codified	knowledge,	make	the	fiduciary	aspect	particularly	significant	for	this	type	of	transaction.		These	interactive	learning	networks,	which,	as	we	have	said,	distinguish	EPO-companies,	should	not	however	be	isolated	from	the	internal	characteristics	of	these	companies,	since	they	affect	performance	only	 through	 the	mediation	of	precise	organizational	 strategies.	This	 is	 clearly	shown	by	 an	 index	 that	 detects	 an	 organizational	model	 based	 on	 the	 companies’	 strategic	




Table 2 Innovative partnerships. Collaborations with companies, universities and research centres 
based on the index of strategic integration (% values) 
Level of strategic integration Medium -Low  High 
No collaboration 23.9 15.1 
From 1 to 5 41.1 31.4 
Over 5 35.0 53.5 
Total 100.0 100 
No. cases 180 172 
Source: EP0-survey 2010 
Note: The	 “strategic	 integration	 index”	was	derived	 from	analysis	both	 semantic	 (affinity	of	content)	and	statistical	 (factor	analysis)	conducted	on	 five	variables:	 (V1)	 the	percentage	of	graduate	employees;	(V2)	the	presence	of	internal	training;	(V3)	the	operational	autonomy	of	the	research	team;	(V4)	the	autonomy	of	the	team's	researchers;	(V5)	the	existence	of	a	strong	employee	 commitment	 to	 the	 company's	 goals.	 Factor	 analysis	 was	 conducted	 with	 the	statistical	program	SPSS,	using	the	method	of	main	components	and	oblique	rotation	(direct	oblimin).	The	analysis	led	to	the	extraction	of	two	factors	that	together	explain	50.1%	of	the	variance.	The	Kaiser-Meyer-Oikin	(KMO)	test	registers	a	sufficient	value,	even	if	not	good,	equal	to	0.53	while	the	Bartlett	sphericity	test	gave	a	significant	result	(p	≤	0.01).	On	the	basis	of	this	
                                               6	For	details	see	the	Methodological	Appendix,	point	no.	4.	
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analysis,	two	indices	were	built.	The	first	–	organizational	flexibility	and	cohesion	–	is	based	on	the	 last	 three	 variables	 (v3	 +	 v4	 +	 v5)	 and	 assumes	 the	 maximum	 value	 when	 there	 is	simultaneous	occurrence	of	team	autonomy,	researcher	autonomy	and	employee	involvement.	The	second	–	human	capital	–	 is	based	on	the	first	two	variables	(v1	+	v2)	and	assumes	the	maximum	 value	 in	 case	 of	 the	 coexistence	 of	 a	 high	 endowment	 of	 graduates	 and	 training	activities.	The	 two	 indices	were	 then	aggregated	 in	 the	strategic	 integration	 index	(range	of	variation	 0-2),	 which	 was	 used	 exclusively	 for	 typological	 purposes	 –	 i.e.	 to	 identify	 an	organizational	type	characterized	by	high	levels	of	human	capital/organizational	flexibility	and	cohesion	(index	scores	=>	1.5).	For other details see Appendix. 	To	this	must	be	added	the	fact	already	mentioned	in	the	second	section,	and	that	is	that	the	embeddedness	 of	 innovation	 also	 has	 a	 clear	 territorial	 matrix.	 EPO-companies	 are	 highly	agglomerated	 in	urban	areas	 and	most	 of	 them	are	 from	 innovation	 leading	 systems	 in	 the	mechanical	 engineering	 and	 high-tech	 sectors,	 which	 register	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 Italian	patenting	 activities	 in	 the	 two	 sectors.	 The	 identification	 of	 the	 social	 and	 economic	characteristics	 of	 innovation	 territories	 was	 one	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 survey	 on	 Italian	companies	with	European	patents.	The	study	of	the	territorial	context	has	revealed	a	highly	qualified	environmental	profile	not	only	from	an	economic-productive	point	of	view,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	endowment	of	local	collective	goods.7		What	makes	the	innovation	leading	systems	in	the	sectors	of	mechanical	engineering	and	high-tech	stand	out?	Compared	to	other	 local	economic	systems	(control	group)	–	endowed	with	good	 entrepreneurial	 and	 productive	 resources	 in	 the	 two	 sectors	 but	 with	 a	 far	 lower	patenting	 capacity	–	what	most	differentiates	 the	 leading	 systems	 is	 the	quality	of	 the	 local	collective	goods.	In	fact,	in	order	to	develop	a	highly	innovative	local	system,	in	addition	to	an	adequate	economic	and	entrepreneurial	base,	the	support	of	a	strong	institutional	structure	is	also	 necessary;	 the	 latter	 comprises	 a	 good	 endowment	 of	 human	 capital	 and	 university	centres,	a	developed	infrastructure	network,	advanced	services	and	a	high	quality	of	life. 	The	relevance	of	“contextual	factors”	also	finds	precise	confirmation	in	the	evaluations	given	by	our	interviewees	regarding	the	quality	and	importance	of	collective	goods	present	in		their	territory	(Table	3).								 	
Table 3 Local collective goods present in the territorial area where EPO companies are located (% 
values) 
                                               7	This	part	of	 the	study	was	carried	out	using	ecological	variables,	a	series	of	 indicators	and	 indices,	highly	disaggregated	at	territorial	level,	and	deriving	from	a	plurality	of	sources.	For	data	sources	and	the	ecological	results	of	the	analysis,	please	consult	Biagiotti	(2010).	
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% of EPO companies that answered that 
are: 
present in the 
territory in which 
they are located  
important for the success of 
their innovations (Score >5 - 
scale 1/10) 
Private services for research and innovation  69.0 53.2 
Private services for legal and commercial 
consultancy  82.7 54.0 
Universities and public research centres   86.5 65.2 
Specialised financial services for innovative 
activities  65.6 51.3 
Possibility of collaboration with other 
companies  76.8 66.1 
Possibility of collaboration with clients 80.7 79.9 
Good endowment of human resources  77.7 80.6 
Good communication and logistic 
infrastructure  75.5 73.2 
Good quality of public services 54.5 60.2 
Good standard of living  87.1 77.8 
Source: EP0-survey 2010. 	
7.	Innovative	and	economic	performances		This	brings	us	to	the	performance	of	EPO-companies	during	the	years	of	the	economic	crisis.	The	R&D	activities	 carried	out	 in	 the	preceding	years	have	on	 the	whole	produced	positive	economic	 results.	 In	 fact,	 almost	 a	 third	 of	 the	 turnover	 of	 EPO-companies	 is	 derived	 from	patented	 products.	 There	 is,	 however,	 no	 automatic	 link	 between	 research,	 patenting,	innovation	 and	 economic	 performance.	 Patent	 activity	 is	 often	 regarded	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	
innovative	output.	In	reality,	it	indicates	above	all	the	attitude	of	companies	towards	research.	First,	it	shows	technological	capacity	and	inventive	output	and,	secondly,	competitive	strategies	(not	all	patents	are	marketed,	since	sometimes	their	main	purpose	is	to	block	the	competition	rather	than	contribute	towards	innovation).	It	is	a	good	idea,	therefore,	to	keep	it	distinct	from	
company	innovation	–	the	introduction,	in	other	words,	of	new	products	and	new	technological	solutions	relating	to	processes,	organization	and	market	designed	to	improve	the	company’s	competitiveness	and	market	position.		That	being	said,	alongside	research,	EPO-companies	have	also	realised	many	innovations.	Over	the	last	three-year	period,	almost	all	of	them	introduced	a	new	product	or	service	to	the	market	(89%);	 nearly	 three-quarters	 of	 them	 introduced	 process	 (71%)	 and	 organizational	 (74%)	innovations;	half	of	them,	innovations	in	marketing	(50%)	(source:	EP0-survey	2010).	Again,	also	in	this	case	these	are	extraordinarily	high	values	when	you	consider	that,	between	2008	and	2010,	only	31%	of	Italian	companies	with	more	than	10	employees	managed	to	achieve	some	form	of	product/service	or	process	innovation	(European	average,	39	%)	(CIS,	2010).		Finally,	 let’s	 look	 at	 economic	 performance.	 Despite	 the	 economic	 crisis,	 in	 the	 three	 years	studied	by	the	first	survey	(2007-2009),	EPO-companies	showed	positive	results	on	average:	employees	increased	by	8%	and	turnovers	by	19%.	Only	in	2009	did	the	turnover	remain	static.	It	is	worth	noting	that,	in	the	same	period,	Italian	industrial	companies	suffered	heavy	setbacks:	in	the	first	half	of	2009,	the	index	of	industrial	production	fell	by	23%,	with	a	peak	of	36	%	in	the	manufacturing	 of	 machinery	 and	mechanical	 equipment	 sector;	 in	 the	 second	 half,	 the	decline	was	slower	but	still	significant	(-14%	and	-28	%	respectively).	The	second	survey,	which	refers	to	the	next	three-year	period	(2010-2012),	also	confirms	the	good	performance	of	EPO-companies.	Only	6%	of	them	ceased	activity	(compared	to	a	national	average	of	18%).	All	 the	other	companies	who	agreed	 to	 respond	 to	 the	new	questionnaire	continued	to	carry	out	innovative	activity,	producing	good	economic	results:	41%	significantly	increased	resources	devoted	to	research	and	development;	45%	increased	their	turnover	and	
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19%	 remained	 stable;	 45%	 increased	 the	 number	 of	 their	 employees	 and	 49%	maintained	previous	levels	(only	6%	reduced	staff).	EPO-companies,	 therefore,	continued	to	perform	well	even	in	the	worst	period	of	the	global	economic	crisis.	Amongst	the	more	than	400	companies	who	responded	to	the	initial	survey,	however,	a	marked	heterogeneity	in	performance	is	visible,	especially	with	regard	to	the	trend	in	 turnover	 and	 productivity.	 Those	 who	 suffered	 most	 in	 the	 crisis	 were	 the	 mechanical	engineering	companies,	the	largest	and	the	most	exposed	to	international	markets.	Conversely,	small	and	medium	companies	–	especially	in	high-tech	areas	–	show	better	results.		The	 factors	 that	 explain	 economic	 performance	 and	 innovative	 performance,	 however,	 are	significantly	different.	The	ability	to	achieve	a	high	output	of	innovation	relates	to	the	techno-scientific	 configuration	 of	 the	 company:	 high	 levels	 of	 education	 amongst	 employees;	 the	presence	 of	 a	 reasonable	 number	 of	 researchers;	 good	 internal	 collaborative	 relations;	 the	circulation	of	non-redundant	knowledge	gained	through	external	sources;	a	rich	network	of	innovative	partnerships.	To	these	characteristics	may	then	be	added	the	relatively	recent	origin	of	 the	company	and	a	patenting	strategy	clearly	aimed	at	 the	productive	exploitation	of	 the	discoveries	made.	Where	economic	performance	 is	 concerned,	 together	with	some	of	 the	variables	mentioned	before,	 other	 elements	 also	 become	 relevant,	 mainly	 connected	 to	 organizational	 and	entrepreneurial	choices.	Company	size	and	competitiveness	are	both	significant:	in	particular,	the	performance	on	extra-regional	markets,	and	the	ability	to	address	the	demand	of	public	administrations	 (especially	 for	 medium	 to	 large	 companies),	 large	 companies	 (for	 small	companies)	and	final	consumers.	Also	important	is	the	commercial	success	of	one	of	the	patents	obtained.8		But	what	matters	most	–	and	this	is	the	point	I	would	like	to	draw	attention	to	in	this	article	–	is	the	presence	of	a	collaborative	corporate	culture,	both	externally	and	internally.	In	fact,	both	in	the	first	phase	of	the	crisis	(EP0-survey	2010)	and	in	the	one	that	followed	(EP0-survey	2012),	innovative	 partnerships	 have	 significantly	 improved	 the	 occupational	 performance	 of	 the	companies	 (Table	 4).	 And	 this	 is	 especially	 true	 for	 those	 who	 have	 avoided	 the	 “trap	 of	localism”,	often	combining	short	and	long	networks.		
Table 4 Innovative partnerships and occupational performance of companies  ( % values) 
Percentage of companies that increased number of 
employees during the period: 2007-2009  2010-2012 
Innovative partnerships    
None 25.0 37.9 
At least one 39.3 51.8 
Geographical collocation of partnerships    
Regional & extra-regional 43.0 53.7 
Only extra-regional 36.4 55.2 
   
No. cases 225 141 
Source: EP0-survey 2010; EP0-survey 2012 . 
Note: for details see Appendix. 	
                                               8	With	reference	to	these	aspects,	please	again	see	Ramella	e	Trigilia	(2010a).	
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The	 ability	 to	 capitalize	 on	 external	 resources,	 however,	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	organizational	 model	 that	 has	 been	 chosen	 internally.	 Companies	 with	 high	 strategic	
integration	not	only	have	a	greater	number	of	innovative	partnerships	but	also	better	economic	performance.	An	interesting	effect	of	interaction	may	be	observed	between	these	two	aspects	of	corporate	culture:	in	fact,	companies	that	combine	a	high	level	of	internal	integration	and	external	partnerships	–	that	possess,	in	other	words,	a	corporate	culture	of	collaboration	–	are	those	that	register	the	best	occupational	and	economic	results	(Table	5	).		
Table 5 The economic-occupational performances of companies according to entrepreneurial  and 
organizational strategies (% values) 
Companies with  
Increase in number 
of employees 
high 
economic performance  
 2007-2009 2010-2012 2007-2009 
No innovative partnership  25.0 37.9 27.3 
At least one partnership, with:     
Low strategic integration  35.2 40.4 46.9 
High strategic integration  42.7 64.8 54.9 
    
No. cases 225 141 166 
Source: EP0-survey 2010; EP0-survey 2012 . 
Note: The	“economic	performance	index”	was	built,	in	an	additive	way,	from	the	following	variables	(the	weighting	coefficients	employed	are	in	brackets):	1)	labour	productivity	(turnover	per	employee)	in	2009	(0.47);	2)	variation	in	labour	productivity	between	2007	and	2009	(0.40);	3)	variation	in	turnover	between	2007	and	2009	(0.48).	These	variables	have	been	identified	from	a	factorial	analysis	(principal	component	analysis,	varimax	rotation	method)	that	led	to	the	extraction	of	a	factor	that	explains	the	57.4%	of	variance.	The	Kaiser-Meyer-Oikin	(KMO)	test	recorded	a	value	of	0.61	and	the	result	of	Bartlett's	sphericity	test	was	significant	(p	≤	0.001).	The	two	classes	of	“economic	performance	index”	(high/low)	were	obtained	by	referring	to	the	median	of	the	distribution.	For other details see Appendix. 
	The	importance	of	corporate	culture	and,	in	particular,	internal	organizational	strategy	is	also	confirmed	by	multivariate	statistical	analysis	(logistic	regression)	carried	out	on	the	companies	that	provided	data	on	employment	trends	between	2010	and	2012.	For	reasons	of	analytical	parsimony,	a	model	was	tested	consisting	of	few	variables,	which,	however,	makes	it	possible	to	correctly	classify	75%	of	the	EPO-companies	(as	opposed	to	50%	in	the	model	with	only	the	intercept).	The	analysis	shows	that	the	chance	that	companies	increased	or	did	not	increase	employment	during	the	hardest	years	of	the	crisis	can	be	predicted	by	the	combination	of	four	variables,	only	two	of	which,	however,	are	significant:	the	occupational		trend	in	the	previous	period	(2007-9),	and	the	strategic	 integration	of	 the	companies	(Table	6;	 for	details	see	the	Methodological	Appendix,	point	no.	4).						
TABLE 6 Logistic regression that predicts if a company has increased employment in the period 
2010-12 
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Summary of model Nagelkerke R2  c2 df Sig. No. cases 
included  
.407 33.91 4 .000 93 
 
Variable in equation B E.S. df Sig. Exp (B) 
Presence of innovation (2007-9) .311 1.329 1 .815 1.364 
Innovative partnerships (2007-9) -.088 .872 1 .919 0.915 
Strategic integration (2007-9) 1.924 .543 1 .000 6.850 
Variation in employees (2007-9) 2.238 .579 1 .000 9.371 
Constant -2.755 1.528 1 .071 .064 
Data source: EP0-survey 2010; EP0-survey 2012 . 
Note: for details see Appendix. 	
8.	Conclusions:	the	embedded	complementarities	of	innovation		The	results	of	the	two	surveys	on	Italian	companies	with	European	patents	in	the	mechanical	engineering	and	high-tech	sectors	provide	a	clear	response	to	the	questions	that	were	asked	at	the	 beginning	 of	 this	 article	 regarding	 their	 distinctive	 characteristics	 and	 their	 behaviour	during	the	international	economic	crisis.	What	are	the	specific	features	that	differentiate	EPO-companies	from	the	others?	First	of	all,	they	are	solid	companies	operating	in	highly	competitive	and	 uncertain	 markets.	 Even	 though,	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 cases	 they	 are	 small	 or	 medium	companies,	compared	to	the	national	average,	medium-large	companies	are	over-represented.	Second,	 they	 are	 highly	 innovative	 –	 research-intensive	 companies	 that	 introduce	 many	innovations	to	the	market.	Third,	they	are	deeply	embedded	at	both	a	social	and	territorial	level.	The	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 competitive	 environments	 is,	 in	 fact,	 dealt	 with	 through	 the	 socio-economic	embeddedness	of	their	activities.		One	of	the	elements	that	most	distinguishes	EPO-companies	is	their	 innovative	partnerships:	external	 collaborations	 for	 research	 and	 innovation	 activities.	 Such	 partnerships	 are	 fairly	generalised	in	these	companies,	as	is	the	use	of	external	sources	of	information.	Innovation,	as	we	have	seen,	also	has	a	clear	territorial	embeddedness.	Most	EPO-companies	hail	 from	the	leading	innovative	systems	in	mechanical	engineering	and	high	technology;	that	is,	they	operate	in	local	contexts	that	are	highly	qualified	in	both	economic	and	socio-institutional	terms.	That	said,	their	innovative	partnerships	are	not	confined	exclusively	to	a	local	level.	The	companies	with	the	best	 innovative	performance	manage	to	combine	the	advantages	of	short	networks	(local	and	regional)	with	those	of	long	networks	(extra-regional).	But	even	the	latter	are	socially	embedded.	The	majority	of	innovative	partnerships,	in	fact,	do	not	respond	to	purely	economic	and	market	logic,	but	are	based	on	collaborations	in	which	reciprocal	trust	plays	a	major	role. 	Another	aspect	that	emerges	from	the	research	is	the	 importance	of	the	socio-organizational	
dimension.	An	organization	that	supports	its	research	teams	with	the	appropriate	means	and	allows	 them	 full	 independence,	 creating	 cohesive	 working	 groups	 based	 on	 flexible	coordination	methods	and	a	good	mix	of	research	integration	and	researcher	autonomy,	will	significantly	enhance	inventive/innovative	performance.	This	last,	therefore,	does	not	depend	exclusively	on	the	characteristics	of	individual	researchers	and	not	even	on	the	simple	sum	of	those	in	the	research	team.	Rather,	 it	manifests	as	an	emergent	property	of	(often	informal)	group	interactions	that	are	facilitated	by	an	appropriate	organizational	structure.		The	 fourth	 and	 last	 element	 that	 distinguishes	 EPO-companies	 is	 their	 high	 economic	
performance.	These	are	companies	with	high	 levels	of	 turnover,	productivity	and	exporting,	that	have	been	able	to	maintain	a	discreet	dynamism	even	during	the	most	difficult	years	of	the	economic	crisis.	And	this	is	due	to	the	proactive	behaviour	of	the	preceding	period,	especially	
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in	the	area	of	research	and	innovation.	That	said,	the	link	between	innovation	and	economic	performance	is	not	automatic:	even	among	EPO-companies,	revenue	demonstrates	a	high	level	of	 heterogeneity.	 This	 heterogeneity	 depends	 on	 variable	 manufacturing,	 managerial	 and	market	 expertise,	which	 is	 not	 necessarily	 associated	with	 the	 technico-scientific	 skills	 and	innovative	capacity	present	within	a	company.		In	any	case,	a	significant	role	is	played	by	what	we	have	defined	as	a	“collaborative	corporate	culture”.	In	particular,	positive	results	in	terms	of	employment	and	turnover	require	a	strong	
strategic	 integration:	 a	good	endowment	of	human	capital	 and	organizational	practices	 that	valorise	 both	 work	 autonomy	 and	 company	 flexibility	 and	 cohesion.	 It	 is	 this	 internal	
organizational	design	 that	 augments	 the	effectiveness	of	external	 innovative	partnerships.	 In	addition	to	the	importance	of	the	organizational	dimension,	I	also	want	to	emphasise	the	close	relationship	that	unites	the	cognitive	and	fiduciary	aspects	in	innovation	processes.	The	socio-normative	 component	 is	 often	 neglected	 in	 innovation	 studies,	 especially	 those	 from	 an	economic	 perspective.	 However,	 the	 generation	 of	 new	 knowledge	 and	 its	 economic	valorisation	depends	on	the	social	capital	that	the	company	may	have	internally,	as	well	as	in	its	external	relations.	Internal	cohesion	does	not	necessarily	imply	homogeneity	of	knowledge	and	 judgment	 criteria,	 nor	 absence	 of	 conflict.	 It	 is,	 however,	 the	 condition	 that	 makes	 it	possible	to	successfully	integrate	the	variety	of	resources	available	both	inside	and	outside	the	company.		That	being	said,	what	emerges	from	the	research	into	EPO-companies	is	the	complementarity	of	 resources	 useful	 for	 innovation	 and	 economic	performance	between:	 a)	 the	 internal	 and	external	 relations	 of	 the	 organization;	 b)	 the	 variety	 of	 knowledge	 and	 cohesion	 of	relationships;	 c)	 the	 short	 and	 long	 networks	 of	 collaboration.	 In	 conclusion,	 successful	company	strategies	are	those	which	–	thanks	to	a	collaborative	company	culture	–	are	able	to	exploit	the	embedded	complementarity	of	innovative	resources.		What	lessons	of	a	more	general	kind	can	be	drawn	from	the	results	of	this	research?	Some,	as	we	 have	 seen,	 concern	 the	management	 and	 organizational	 strategies	 useful	 for	 promoting	improved	business	performance.	Others,	instead,	concern	the	public	actors	and	policies	useful	in	 the	 support	 of	 long-term	 development	 strategy.	 Research,	 in	 fact,	 confirms	 the	 strategic	importance	of	local	collective	goods	and	the	“systemic”	nature	of	innovation.	In	the	light	of	these	assumptions,	therefore,	the	policies	shown	to	be	particularly	appropriate	are	those	that	aim	to	strengthen	 and	 improve	 the	 national/regional	 system	 of	 innovation	 and	 the	 collaboration	between	 the	 various	 actors	 involved	 therein	 (companies,	 research	 centres,	 universities,	funding	agencies	etc.	 In	contrast,	over	the	last	twenty	years,	the	policy	mix	adopted	by	Italy	(and	 the	 other	Mediterranean	 countries)	 has	 been	 focused	 on	 direct	 support	 to	 companies	(European	Commission	2013b).	Moreover,	during	the	crisis,	government	policies	–	also	taking	into	 account	 the	 constraints	 imposed	 by	 the	 EU	 –	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 public	expenditure	rather	than	on	research	funding,	advanced	training	and	the	endowment	of	public	goods	 for	 innovation.	 This	 ‘low	 road	 to	 competitiveness’	 is	 thus	 likely	 to	 produce	 a	 further	weakening	of	the	Italian	capacity	for	innovation.	The	crisis,	instead,	could	have	represented	an	appropriate	moment	for	a	strategic	rethinking	of	development	policies,	by	interpreting	it	as	an	opportunity	 to	 solve	 the	 structural	 problems	 of	 the	 national	 system	 of	 innovation	 and	 to	promote	more	systemic	policies	for	innovation	and	long-term	growth.9		
                                               9	Only	 in	 the	 last	 year	 has	 there	 been	 some	 evidence	 of	 a	 rethinking	 in	 this	 direction	 beginning	 to	emerge;	for	example,	with	the	“Piano	Nazionale	Industria	4.0”	(National	Industry	Plan	4.0)	launched	by	the	 Italian	 government	 to	 encourage	 –	 through	 an	 integrated	 approach	 –	 the	 digitization	 of	manufacturing	sectors.	
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1.	Territorial	analysis:	the	EPO	patents	During	the	first	phase	of	research	the	geography	of	innovation	in	Italy	was	analyzed.	We	used	the	 number	 of	 patent	 applications	 filed	 by	 Italian	 enterprises,	 individuals	 and	 public	organizations	between	1995	and	2004	at	the	European	agency	for	the	protection	of	intellectual	property	rights	as	indicator.	The	information	on	the	patents	was	collected	through	the	database	of	the	European	Patent	Office	(EPO	-	http://ep.espacenet.com).		To	 identify	 the	 high	 and	 medium-high	 technology	 sectors	 we	 used	 the	 Eurostat-OECD	classification	 (manufacturing	 industries	 classified	 according	 to	 their	 global	 technological	intensity)	 that	 divides	 manufacturing	 into	 four	 classes	 according	 to	 a	 descending	 order	 of	technology	intensity.		The	 geographical	 localisation	 of	 these	 patents	 was	 reconstructed	 at	 a	 particularly	 precise	territorial	 (sub-regional)	 level,	 that	of	 “local	 labour	systems”	(LLS).	These	are	the	territorial	units	created	by	ISTAT,	the	Central	Institute	of	Italian	Statistics,	on	the	basis	of	“home	to	work	commuting”:	 that	 is,	 identifying	 the	 areas	where	 there	 is	 a	 high	 “self-containment”	 of	 daily	population	movement	for	reasons	of	work.			
2.	The	survey	of	EPO	companies	2a.	In	the	second	phase	of	the	research,	the	analytical	focus	shifted	from	the	socio-economic	characteristics	of	territories	to	the	organizational	and	relational	characteristics	of	companies.	The	reference	 in	this	part	of	 the	survey	was	to	high	technology	and	mechanical	engineering	companies.	A	panel-survey	was	used:	the	same	businesses	were	interviewed	in	two	successive	stages.	 To	 identify	 the	 universe	 of	 reference,	 5,313	 European	 patents	 granted	 to	 Italian	recipients	in	the	mechanical	engineering	and	high	technology	fields	were	analyzed.	This	base	was	converted	into	a	list	of	1,504	active	companies,	to	which	a	questionnaire	was	electronically	administered	(CAWI	method:	computer	assisted	web	interviewing).			2b.	 The	 first	 research	 stage	 (EP0-survey	 2010)	 was	 carried	 out	 in	 early	 2010	 and	 407	companies	responded	–	in	whole	or	in	part	–	to	the	questionnaire,	a	response	rate	of	27%.	The	second	 stage	 (EP0-survey	 2012)	 was	 replicated	 in	 late	 2012	 using:	 a)	 the	 same	 sample	 of	companies	that	had	responded	to	the	first	survey;	b)	the	same	 investigation	techniques.	155	companies	responded	to	the	second	interview,	a	response	rate	equal	to	40%	of	the	companies	that	were	still	active/available.	The	analysis	of	the	profile	of	the	companies	that	did	not	respond	to	 the	questionnaire	did	not	show	any	systematic	distortion	of	 the	sample	compared	 to	 the	universe	 of	 reference.	 In	 the	 first	 survey,	 a	 sample	 audit	was	 carried	 out	 (407	 companies)	compared	 to	 the	 universe	 (1,504	 companies)	 based	 on	 the	 geographical	 localisation	 and	industrial	 sector	 of	 the	 companies.	 In	 the	 second	 survey,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 previous	 two	variables,	 the	sample	(155	companies)	was	also	compared	to	 the	universe	(407	companies)	according	to	the	size	class	of	the	employees.	In	all	cases,	the	sample/universe	deviations	were	always	very	limited,	comprising	between	3%	and	8%	(the	latter	percentage	refers	to	the	second	survey,	and	the	comparison	of	class	size).		
3.	The	inventors	3a.	The	survey	(Inventors-Survey)	
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Index	of	strategic	integration	The	“strategic	integration	index”	was	derived	from	analysis	both	semantic	(affinity	of	content)	and	statistical	(factor	analysis)	conducted	on	five	variables:	(V1)	the	percentage	of	graduate	employees;	 (V2)	 the	 presence	 of	 internal	 training;	 (V3)	 the	 operational	 autonomy	 of	 the	research	 team;	 (V4)	 the	autonomy	of	 the	 team's	 researchers;	 (V5)	 the	existence	of	a	 strong	employee	 commitment	 to	 the	 company's	 goals.	 Factor	 analysis	 was	 conducted	 with	 the	statistical	program	SPSS,	using	the	method	of	main	components	and	oblique	rotation	(direct	oblimin).	The	analysis	led	to	the	extraction	of	two	factors	that	together	explain	50.1%	of	the	variance.	The	Kaiser-Meyer-Oikin	(KMO)	test	registers	a	sufficient	value,	even	if	not	good,	equal	to	0.53	while	the	Bartlett	sphericity	test	gave	a	significant	result	(p	≤	0.01).	On	the	basis	of	this	analysis,	two	indices	were	built.	The	first	–	organizational	flexibility	and	cohesion	–	is	based	on	the	 last	 three	 variables	 (v3	 +	 v4	 +	 v5)	 and	 assumes	 the	 maximum	 value	 when	 there	 is	simultaneous	occurrence	of	team	autonomy,	researcher	autonomy	and	employee	involvement.	The	second	–	human	capital	–	 is	based	on	the	first	two	variables	(v1	+	v2)	and	assumes	the	maximum	 value	 in	 case	 of	 the	 coexistence	 of	 a	 high	 endowment	 of	 graduates	 and	 training	activities.	The	 two	 indices	were	 then	aggregated	 in	 the	strategic	 integration	 index	(range	of	variation	 0-2),	 which	 was	 used	 exclusively	 for	 typological	 purposes	 –	 i.e.	 to	 identify	 an	organizational	type	characterized	by	high	levels	of	human	capital/organizational	flexibility	and	cohesion	(index	scores	=>	1.5).	The	variables	in	the	index	refer	to	the	following	questions	in	the	questionnaire:	1. V1	What	percentage	of	employees	have	a	degree,	of	 the	kind	 indicated?	 (Degree	and	post-graduate,	 high	 school	 graduate,	 vocational	 school	 graduate,	 middle-school	graduate)	
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Table	5		The	“economic	performance	index”	was	built,	in	an	additive	way,	from	the	following	variables	(the	weighting	 coefficients	 employed	are	 in	brackets):	 1)	 labour	productivity	 (turnover	per	employee)	in	2009	(0.47);	2)	variation	in	labour	productivity	between	2007	and	2009	(0.40);	3)	variation	in	turnover	between	2007	and	2009	(0.48).	These	variables	have	been	identified	from	a	factorial	analysis	(principal	component	analysis,	varimax	rotation	method)	that	led	to	the	extraction	of	a	factor	that	explains	the	57.4%	of	variance.	The	Kaiser-Meyer-Oikin	(KMO)	test	 recorded	a	value	of	0.61	and	 the	 result	of	Bartlett's	 sphericity	 test	was	 significant	 (p	≤	0.001).	 The	 two	 classes	 of	 “economic	 performance	 index”	 (high/low)	 were	 obtained	 by	referring	to	the	median	of	the	distribution.	In	the	two	surveys,	to	elicit	the	turnover,	the	following	question	was	asked:	What	was	 the	 turnover	 in	 the	 last	 three	 years?	 (EP0-survey	 2010:	 2007,	 2008,	 2009.	 EP0-survey	2010:	2010,	2011	and	2012).	For	the	other	variables,	see	the	comments	to	the	previous	tables.			
Table	6	The	 table	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 a	 binomial	 logistic	 regression	which	 I	 conducted	 on	 the	 93	companies	for	which	all	relevant	information	is	available.	As	the	dependent	variable,	I	used	the	employment	trends	between	2010	and	2012:	the	first	class	includes	the	companies	in	which	the	number	of	employees	remained	stable	or	decreased,	the	second	those	in	which	it	increased.	I	preferred	to	use	this	variable,	rather	than	that	related	to	the	variation	in	turnover,	as	it	had	fewer	missings.			As	regards	the	independent	variables,	I	used	4	dichotomous	predictors:	1)	companies	with	at	least	 one	 innovative	 partnership	 in	 the	 period	 2007-9;	 2)	 companies	 with	 at	 least	 one	innovation	in	the	period	2007-9	(see	below);	3)	companies	with	high	strategic	integration	in	the	period	2007-9;	4)	companies	that	have	increased	employment	in	the	period	2007-9.		
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Other	regressions	performed	-	for	control	purposes	-	with	variables	related	to	market	strategies	(%	of	foreign	sales)	and	intensity	of	research	produced	similar	results.			Variable	2	refers	to	companies	that	gave	an	affirmative	answer	to	at	least	one	of	the	following	questions	in	the	questionnaire:	In	the	last	three	years,	has	the	company	introduced:			 1. 1.	Innovations		in	Products/Service?	a.	Technologically	new	(or	significantly	improved)	products?		b.	Technologically	new	(or	significantly	improved)	services?		.	2. 4.	Innovations	in	Processes?	a.	technologically	new	(or	significantly	improved)	production	processes?		b.	Systems	of	 logistics,	distribution	methods	or	external	supply	of	technologically	new	(or	significantly	improved)	products	or	services?		c.	 Other	 technologically	 new	 (or	 significantly	 improved)	 processes	 concerning	 the	management	 of	 purchasing,	 maintenance	 and	 support	 activities,	 management	 of	administrative	and	information	systems,	accounting	activities?		3. Organizational	innovations?	a.	 New	 (or	 significantly	 improved)	 management	 techniques	 to	 enhance	 the	 use	 and	exchange	of	information,	knowledge	and	technical	skills	and	internal	work?	b.	New	forms	of	work	organization,	such	as	the	definition	of	new	divisional	or	business	units,	 the	 reduction	 of	 hierarchical	 levels,	 the	 decentralization	 of	 company	 decision	making?	c.	 Changes	 in	 relationships	with	 other	 companies	 or	 public	 institutions,	 such	 as	 new	production	 and	 commercial	 agreements,	 partnerships,	 sub-contracting	 agreements	 or	outsourcing?						4.			Marketing	innovations?	a.	 Significant	 changes	 in	 the	 aesthetic	 characteristics	 of	 the	 products,	 including	 those	relating	to	packaging?	b.	New	(or	significantly	improved)	marketing	techniques	and	practices	or	distribution	of	products	 or	 services,	 such	 as	 electronic	 commerce,	 franchising,	 direct	 sales	 or	distribution	licenses?		For	the	other	variables,	see	the	comments	on	the	previous	tables.	
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